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Secret Image Sharing Using Grayscale Payload Decomposition and Irreversible Image 
Steganography 
Abstract. To provide an added security level most of the existing 
reversible as well as irreversible image steganography schemes 
emphasize on encrypting the secret image (payload) before embedding 
it to the cover image. The complexity of encryption for a large payload 
where the embedding algorithm itself is complex may adversely affect 
the steganographic system. Schemes that can induce same level of 
distortion, as any standard encryption technique with lower 
computational complexity, can improve the performance of stego 
systems. In this paper we propose a secure secret image sharing 
scheme, which bears minimal computational complexity. The 
proposed scheme, as a replacement for encryption, diversifies the 
payload into different matrices which are embedded into carrier image 
(cover image) using bit X-OR operation. A payload is a grayscale 
image which is divided into frequency matrix, error matrix, and sign 
matrix. The frequency matrix is scaled down using a mapping 
algorithm to produce Down Scaled Frequency (DSF) matrix. The DSF 
matrix, error matrix, and sign matrix are then embedded in different 
cover images using bit X-OR operation between the bit planes of the 
matrices and respective cover images. Analysis of the proposed 
scheme shows that it effectively camouflages the payload with 
minimum computation time.  
Keywords: DSF matrix, error matrix, sign matrix, bit 
plane 
1 Introduction 
Image steganography is the science of concealing information 
and messages within an image using some embedding 
algorithm. In modern days communication security is the 
fundamental requirement even though accomplishment of 
comprehensive security is a superlative state of affairs. The 
concept of „„What You See Is What You Get (WYSIWYG)‟‟ 
associated with printing capabilities of a printing machine for 
an image, is now a fallacy [1]. Ordinary image is no longer a 
regular image. It could be a mask over a secret message. In 
image Steganography, the mask used to hide any message is a 
color or grayscale image.  
 Two extensive approaches used in image steganography 
are reversible image steganography and irreversible image 
steganography. Message to be embedded within an image is 
known as the payload. After embedding the payload in image 
(more specifically cover image) the resulting image called the 
stego image is sent to the authorized recipient, where the 
payload is recovered. Reversible image steganography derives 
its name from the mode of recovery of the payload wherein the 
recovered cover image is noiseless. On the contrary irreversible 
image steganography strives to achieve high capacity 
embedding without giving much emphasis on the carrier 
recovered during the extraction process. Reversible image 
steganography facilitates the easy detection of any alteration in 
the stego image whereas irreversible image steganography 
achieve high embedding capacity. Motivation for modern day‟s 
image steganography techniques comes from the fact that no 
existing method is self-sufficient. Increasing the embedded 
information could cause easy detection by an attacker, whereas 
enhancing the security could increase the computation and 
communication overhead due to the fact that one secret 
message will take several transmissions. A trade-off between 
embedding capacity and the level of security needs a strong 
base for a security measure. The proposed scheme tries to 
achieve greater level of security with minimum computation 
time.  
 The failure to cease the suspicion of any hidden data in an 
image is the reason for breakdown of any steganography 
system. The fundamental requirement for any secure 
steganography scheme is the ability to cover the hidden 
message in the cover image. A system is considered to be 
secure if a snooper cannot distinguish between cover image and 
the stego image. There are different measures for 
steganographic security. The most common measure is called 
detectability of a stego system. Detectability is defined as the 
relative entropy between the probability distribution of cover 
image and the stego image. Any steganography system is called 
 -secure if the relative entropy of the system is at most   [1]. 
A steganography scheme is said to be perfectly secure if 
detectability is zero. Reduction in detectability means reduced 
embedding capacity. Any image steganography scheme should 
optimize the embedding capacity to achieve minimum possible 
detectability taking into account the computational overhead. 
The maximum number of bits that can be embedded in a cover 
image and recovered from the stego image without violating 
the undetectability constraints is known as the steganographic 
capacity. The maximum steganographic capacity that an 
existent reversible steganographic scheme can achieve is 
approximately 3 bpp [2].  Perceptual consistency and 
robustness are the most desirable attributes of any 
steganographic system. The capacity of the steganographic 
system is comprehensively enhanced by irreversible models of 
image steganography. Peak signal to noise ratio can be used as 
a measure of steganographic security where the embedding 
capacity of a model is outsized. Increasing secret information 
embedding capacity would mean straightforward steganalysis 
and detection of the hidden information. State of art 
steganalysis attempt to overpower any steganography scheme. 
Biggest challenge of a steganography scheme is to outsmart all 
steganalysis schemes [1]. The science of detecting the 
concealed message in a cover image is steganalysis. The battle 
between steganography and steganalysis is getting on since the 
evolution of the science of steganography. There are several 
ways in which steganalysis can wreck the structure of 
steganography. The most common methods are inspection of 
the inner structure of LSBs, Histogram analysis, feature vector 
analysis et cetera [1]. Primary goal of any image steganography 
scheme is to achieve high level of security with high capacity 
embedding, reduced noise, and minimum computation time.  
2 Related Work 
Many schemes have been proposed in reversible and 
irreversible image steganography. Major work that is going on 
in image steganography attempts to frame steganographic 
structure that effectively hides the payload. Additional security 
is provided by encrypting the payload with encryption 
algorithms, this may however increase the complexity of the 
steganographic scheme two folds. 
Chih-Chiang Lee et al. proposed an adaptive lossless image 
steganography scheme, which embeds variable length secret 
information into fixed sized blocks of cover image. Amount of 
information embedded in each block depends on the 
complexity of the cover image [3]. This method is an 
improvement over Alattar‟s scheme based on generalized 
difference expansion [3], where N successive pixels of cover 
image are taken to embed N-1 bits of secret information. The 
improvement is achieved in embedding capacity by the use of a 
number of non overlapping blocks of size m n  in place of N-1 
difference values to hide the secret information as proposed by 
Alattar [3]. If the secret information under consideration is a 
grayscale image of size a b  and average number of bits 
embedded in each block of size m n is four, then total number 
of such blocks required is
 8
4
a b 
. Hence the size of the 
required cover image is
    8
4
m n a b   
. In this scheme 
secret information is embedded into the centralized difference 
values without encryption. If a small sized grayscale image is 
to be embedded using state of art encryption techniques to add 
another layer of security, enormous computation time may 
reduce the efficiency of the method.      
Reversible image hiding scheme proposed in [4] embeds secret 
information by shifting the histogram of residual image 
computed as the difference of the original cover image and the 
corresponding predictive pixel, called the basic pixel, obtained 
using linear prediction technique. This scheme is an 
improvement over reversible data hiding scheme proposed in 
[5]. The hiding capacity is increased by employing linear 
prediction technique on the cover image to form the residual 
image. A similar approach has been proposed by Lin et al. [6]. 
The secret information embedding scheme proposed in [7] 
hides encrypted payload into a hiding tree computed from 
frequency of absolute error values obtained as the difference of 
the cover image (host image) and predictive image. Predictive 
image is generated using median edge detector (MED) 
predictor. Similar reversible image steganography schemes 
have been proposed in [8-9], where error values are explored to 
embed the secret information. Although state of art 
steganography methods hide the secret information 
comprehensively, encryption is applied on the secret message 
to provide an additional layer of security. The methods of 
image steganography proposed in [4-9] are themselves complex 
enough; hence additional computational complexity of standard 
encryption techniques, such as AES or DES, can reduce the 
efficiency of the steganographic system. LSB replacement is 
the most commonly used irreversible steganographic method. 
In this method, only the LSB plane of the cover image is 
replaced with any of the bit plane of the grayscale payload. As 
a result, the change in bit structure of the original cover image 
is inevitable, and thus the existence of hidden payload even at a 
low embedding rate is possible with the use of some existing 
steganalytic algorithms, such as the Chi-squared attack [10], 
regular or singular groups (RS) analysis [11] and sample pair 
analysis [12]. LSB matching (LSBM) is an improvement over 
LSB replacement. A particular pixel intensity of the cover 
image is either incremented or decremented by 1 if there is a 
match between the secret bit and the LSB of that pixel. Several 
steganalytic algorithms [13-16] have been proposed to analyze 
the stego image encoded using LSBM scheme. Encryption 
techniques are used to foil these steganalytic algorithms.  
The proposed method diffuses the payload across different 
matrices to achieve the same visual distortion as any encryption 
technique. As the payload is distributed into different matrices 
any intruder has to retrieve all matrices to re-compute the 
payload accurately. Any image steganography scheme should 
eliminate the suspicion of the existence of any hidden 
information within the cover image. What we propose is 
another level of security to get around the steganalysis scheme 
which may foil the image steganography used to embed the 
secret information, without incorporating substantial 
computational overhead. The proposed scheme achieves non 
linear polynomial computational growth and better computation 
time.  
3  Proposed Scheme 
In the proposed method we intend to introduce distortion in the 
distributed payload with minimum computation time, which 
appears to be natural distortion caused by the noise in the 
communication channel. The proposed scheme distributes the 
payload into three matrices; DSF matrix, error matrix and sign 
matrix  
All three matrices represent distorted form of original payload. 
Proposed scheme is illustrated in Fig. 1. Down Scaled 
Frequency matrix generator counts and replaces the grayscales 
in the payload with the corresponding counts called the 
frequency. These frequencies are then mapped using a mapping 
function to produce the final DSF matrix. Sign matrix is a 
matrix of zeros and ones. Sign matrix generator places a zero in 
the matrix whenever corresponding grayscale in the payload is 
greater than or equal to the corresponding Down Scaled 
Frequency in the DSF matrix. Difference between DSF matrix 
and the payload called the error matrix is generated by the error 
matrix generator. Stego system encoder embed these three 
matrices, having same dimension as the payload, into the least 
significant bit plane of the cover image using bit X-OR 
operation with the second least significant bit plane of the cover 
image.  
                                     
                                                          
Fig. 1. Payload decomposition into frequency, error and sign matrices; stego-image generation. 
3.1  Matrix Computation 
 Let us define the payload as  
 ij
m n
G g

     (1) 
where, m×n is the size of the payload and gij is the grayscale 
in the ith row and jth column of the payload. Each element of 
the DSF matrix is the Down Scaled Frequency value of 
frequency matrix computed from the payload G. The 
frequency matrix is defined as 
 
   where 1  ij ij ij ij
m n
F f f count g m n g G

        
 (2) 
Where, count (gij) is the number of times gij appears in the 
payload. We define a mapping parameter µ in equation (3) to 
map the frequency matrix into DSF matrix. 
2 , 1,2,3,4,.....8  
                               
(3) 
We define three more parameters upper bound (ub), lower 
bound (lb) and level as 
,where 0,1,2,...........m nub k k  
   
        
(4) 
,  where 0,1,2,...........m nlb ub k 
  
        
    (5) 
1,where 0,1,2,...........m nlevel k k 
  
        
    (6) 
We down scale the frequency of occurrence of a grayscale to 
avoid the overflow of the frequency value. Down Scaled 
Frequency matrix is computed using a mapping function 
denoted as DSF(.). 
Down Scaled Frequency matrix is defined as  
 , where ij ij ij
m n
D d d DSF f

      (7) 
Mapping function DSF( ) is defined as  
   ijfij levelDSF f      
(8) 
such that  and 1,where 0,1,2,...........m nijlb f ub level k k 
    
 
 
To compute the Down Scaled Frequency the frequency value 
of a grayscale is divided by the corresponding level parameter. 
The greatest common integer of the resulting quotient is the 
Down Scaled Frequency for that particular grayscale. The 
value of level parameter depends upon the value of k, which 
intern depends on ub and lb of the frequency of grayscale 
satisfying the constraint ijlb f ub  .  
The error matrix E is the difference between G and D. 
ij ij ij
m n m n
E e g d
 
       
     (9) 
 
Sign matrix S is defined as 
0,
,
1,
ij ij
ij ij
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                  (10) 
Figure 2(a) shows a 4×4 sample payload with different 
grayscales. For ƞ = 1, Table 1 shows values of different 
parameters corresponding to grayscales in the sample payload.  
For grayscale 34g = 4, we have frequency of occurrence 34f = 
3. Every occurrence of grayscale 4 in sample payload is 
Down Scaled 
Frequency Matrix 
Generator 
Sign Matrix 
Generator 
Error Matrix 
Generator 
Stego System 
Encoder 
Payload 
Cover 
Image 
Stego 
Image 
replaced by the corresponding frequency of occurrence to 
generate the frequency matrix as shown in figure 2(b). If we 
take ƞ = 1, then the mapping parameter µ is 2 .The lower 
bound (lb) and upper bound (ub) for the frequency value 3 are 
4 and 6 respectively as shown in Table 1. From equation (4) 
we have k = 2, for ub = 6and µ = 2. The value of level for k = 
2 is 3 as level=k+1.  So, the Down Scale Frequency for 
grayscale 4 is 1, which is computed using the mapping 
function in equation (8). Figure 2(c) shows the DSF matrix for 
the sample payload. The error value for the grayscale 4 is 2 
from equation (9). The sign matrix for the sample payload is 
shown in Figure 2(e). All values in sign matrix are zero due to 
the fact that DSF values in the DSF matrix are less than the 
corresponding grayscale in the sample payload; moreover if 
there had been some DSF values in the DSF matrix greater 
than the corresponding grayscale values then there would have 
been 1s for those DSF values in the sign matrix.  
 
                     
               (a)                        (b)                        (c) 
                                          
                                  (d)                                (e) 
Fig. 2.  Sample payload and corresponding frequency, DSF and error matrices; (a) sample payload, (b) 
frequency matrix, (c) DSF matrix, (d) error matrix, (e) sign matrix 
 
Table 1.     The values of different parameters for frequency and DSF values corresponding to a grayscale in the sample payload 
    ub lb k level frequency DSF 
1 2 4 2 1 2 2 1 
1 2 6 4 2 3 3 1 
1 2 6 4 2 3 4 2 
1 2 8 6 3 4 7 2 
 
The distribution of the payload over DSF and error matrices 
is a better choice not only because it reduces the computation 
time but also due to the fact that even if the intruder is 
familiar with the proposed method of recovery the possibility 
of prediction of a particular secret payload from either 
intercepted DSF or error matrix of an anonymous payload is 
simply not possible. If a payload is encrypted using any 
standard encryption technique and the intruder is familiar 
with the encryption used then the intruder only needs to 
intercept an anonymous encrypted payload that is encrypted 
with same encryption technique to predict the key used to 
encrypt a particular payload. Hence it is possible for the 
intruder to recover the secret payload. From equations (1), (2) 
and (7), it is evident that the Down Scaled Frequency and 
error values for a grayscale are dependent on the 
characteristics of the secret image (payload). Therefore it is 
practically impossible for an intruder to predict a particular 
payload from DSF or the error matrix of an anonymous 
payload.  
3.2 Matrix Embedding 
A grayscale cover image Ci is divided into eight bit planes 
denoted as Cij where i, j = 0, 1…, 7. Cij  is the j
th bit plane of 
the ith cover image. Embedding process make use of two least 
significant bit planes of the cover image; let us denote them 
as Ci0 and Ci1. DSF matrix is divided into eight bit planes; let 
us denote them as Di where i= 0, 1, 2….7. Most significant 
seven bit planes of the stego images are same as the bit planes 
of the respective cover images. The least significant bit plane 
of a stego image is computed as  
0 1 ,  0,1,2,....7i i iC C D i    (11) 
Similarly, error matrix and sign matrix are also embedded 
into different cover images using equation (12) and (13) 
respectively.  
0 1 ,  0,1,2,....7i i iC C E i        
(12) 
         00 01 0
C C S 
                                                        
(13) 
Here Ei denotes the ith bit plane of the error matrix and S0 
denotes the only bit plane of the sign matrix. 
  
 It is intuitive that only the least significant bit plane of 
the cover image is modified by replacing the bits with the bits 
produced by the X-OR operation, denoted as “ ”, between 
the second least significant bit plane of the cover image and 
one of the bit planes of the matrices. There are eight bit 
planes of the DSF matrix, eight bit planes of the error matrix 
and one bit plane of the sign matrix. To embed all these bit 
planes seventeen grayscale cover images are required. 
Diffusion of the payload into different matrices and 
distribution of matrices over different cover images make it 
complex enough for the intruder to extract the hidden payload 
accurately. We use a sample cover image to show the 
embedding procedure for DSF matrix of the sample payload. 
Same procedure is used to embed the error as well as sign 
matrices. Figure 3(a) shows a sample cover image. Eight bit 
planes of the sample cover image are shown in Figure 3(b)-
3(i). The least significant bit plane of the DSF matrix (shown 
in Figure 2(c)) of the sample payload is shown Figure 3(j). 
New bit plane (shown in Figure 3(k)) is computed by taking 
X-OR of the least significant bit plane of the DSF matrix 
(shown in Figure 2(c)) and second least significant bit plane 
(shown in Figure 3(h)) of the sample cover image. In the 
stego image the newly computed bit plane (shown in Figure 
3(k)) replaces the least significant bit plane (shown in Figure 
3(i)) of the sample cover image. All other bit planes of the 
stego image are same as the bit planes of the sample cover 
image. So, one bit plane of the DSF matrix of the sample 
payload is embedded into the sample cover image. Remaining 
bit planes of the DSF matrix can be embedded into the cover 
images using the same procedure. 
  
     
 (a) (b) (c) 
     
 (d) (e) (f) 
     
  (g) (h)  (i) 
          
   (j)  (k) 
Fig. 3.  Sample cover image and its bit planes (a)-(i); (a) sample cover image, (b)-(i) bit planes, (b) most 
significant bit plane, (i) least significant bit plane, (j) least significant bit plane of DSF matrix of sample 
payload, (k) bit plane obtained by X-ORing (h) and (j).  
3.3 Payload Extraction 
The matrices are extracted from stego images by taking X-OR 
of second least significant bit plane with the least significant bit 
plane of the stego image. After the extraction of the DSF 
matrix, error matrix and sign matrix payload is recomputed as 
,  if 0
 where 
,  if 1
ij ij ij
ij ij
m n
ij ij ij
d e s
R r r
d e s
 
      
 (14) 
The recovery of payload in the proposed method is 
computationally efficient as compared to any image 
steganography scheme employing state of art encryption 
technique in view of the fact that only addition or subtraction is 
performed on whether the corresponding value of ijs in the sign 
matrix is zero or one. Extraction process can retrieve matrices 
in parallel thereby reducing the computation time two folds.  
4 Experimental Results 
The proposed scheme has been analyzed on satellite images 
since the difference in pixel intensities of the neighboring 
pixels is very small. As a result significant noise has to be 
induced to hide the visual features of a satellite image. Tests 
have been performed on four satellite images, shown in Fig. 4, 
to observe the visual distortion introduced in three matrices. 
Size of each payload tested is 512×512 pixels. Embedding 
capacity of the scheme is 1 bpp, which is same as LSB 
replacement steganography scheme [10]. Original payload and 
corresponding matrices are shown in Fig. 5. Matrices are 
computed using the mapping parameter  = 256 and  = 8. 
Difference in quality of original payload and the resulting 
matrices is quite substantial to deceive the intruder into 
thinking that some kind of noise has crept into the original 
payload.  Fig. 6, Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 show the bit planes of 
original payload Vrindavan India, corresponding error matrix 
and frequency matrix respectively. The bit planes of the 
matrices are visually different from the bit planes of original 
payload. Distortion introduced in the bit planes of the error and 
frequency matrices is even more. As the bit planes of the 
matrices are transmitted through the channel, it is very difficult 
to predict the original payload from one or two bit planes of the 
matrices. The extracted payload bears no visual dissimilarity 
with the original payload. Results show that the proposed 
scheme does well in concealing the visual features of original 
payload. Suspicion induced by state of art steganalysis schemes 
and subsequent retrieval of the hidden payload can adversely 
affect the secret communication. Hence the visual distortion 
instigated in the resulting matrices and the corresponding bit 
planes prevents unauthorized recovery of the secret payload 
with optimal computation time. 
 
                      
 (a)  (b)                    (c) (d) 
Fig. 4. Original payload: (a) Bangalore junction, (b) Okhla India, (c) Patti India, (d) Vrindavan India (Source: Map data 
©2012 Google Imagery ©2012 Cnes/Spot Image, DigitalGlobe, GeoEye) 
 
  (a) (e) (i)                    (m)  (q) 
 
 (b) (f) (j) (n) (r) 
 
  (c) (g)   (k)  (o) (s)  
 
 (d) (h) (l)                     (p) (t) 
Fig. 5. Original payload (a)-(d), recovered payload (e)-(h), error matrix (i)-(l), DSF matrix (m)-(p), sign matrix (q)-(t). 
    
  (a) (b)  (c) (d)   
    
 (e) (f) (g) (h) 
Fig. 6. Bit plane of original payload Vrindavan India (a)-(h), most significant bit plane (a), least significant bit plane 
(h), intermediate bit plane (b)-(g). 
 
    
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
    
 (e) (f) (g) (h) 
Fig. 7. Bit plane of error matrix of original payload Vrindavan India (a)-(h), most significant bit plane (a), least 
significant bit plane (h), intermediate bit plane (b)-(g). 
 
    
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
    
 (e) (f) (g) (h) 
Fig. 8. Bit plane of frequency matrix of original payload Vrindavan India (a)-(h), most significant bit plane (a), least 
significant bit plane (h), intermediate bit plane (b)-(g). 
4.1 Distortion Strength 
 
Strength of visual distortion in resulting matrices can be 
measured and analyzed with corresponding peak signal to 
noise ratio (PSNR) [17]. PSNR is defined as in equation (15). 
It is the ratio of the square of maximum grayscale intensity to 
the mean square error (MSE) [18] of the original payload and 
the corresponding matrix. 
 
2
max
1010log
I
PSNR dB
MSE
 
  
 
 
 (15) 
MSE for DSF matrix is defined as in equation (14). 
 
2
1 1
1
M N
ij ij
i j
MSE g d
MN
 
   (16) 
Similarly MSE can be computed for error and sign matrices 
using equation (16). Table 1 shows PSNR values for four test 
images and their corresponding matrices. Smaller the PSNR 
value stronger is the distortion in the matrices. Minimum 
PSNR for indistinguishable visual distortion is 30dB [3]. Table 
1 illustrates that enough noise has been introduced in all three 
matrices for each payload under consideration to impede the 
precise interpretation of the satellite imagery. 
Table 2.     PSNR of three matrices for respective payloads 
Original 
Payload 
Error 
matrix  
PSNR 
(dB) 
DSF 
matrix 
 PSNR 
(dB)  
Sign 
matrix  
PSNR 
(dB) 
Bangalore 
Junction  
9.0863 7.9396 4.1143 
Okhla India 9.7589 7.0230 3.4600 
Patti India 9.1781 6.9692 3.6982 
Vrindavan 
India 
9.7201 8.5998 4.1636 
 
4.2 Statistical Analysis 
We have analyzed the statistical distribution of grayscales in 
the original payload and the corresponding DSF and error 
matrices using image histogram. An image histogram 
graphically illustrates the presence of number of pixels of a 
particular grayscale in an image [19]. Fig. 9., Shows the 
histograms of original payloads and their corresponding DSF 
and error matrices. Histograms for DSF and error matrices are 
visually distinct from the histogram of the original payload. 
Different statistical attacks are used to predict the original 
payload from the encrypted payload. DSF and error matrices 
are distinctive enough to avoid any statistical attack, which can 
be used to predict the original payload from the histograms of 
DSF and error matrices.  
 
 
 
 (a) (e) (i) 
 
 (b) (f) (j) 
 
 (c) (g) (k) 
 
 (d) (h) (l) 
Fig. 9. Histogram of original payloads and their respective DSF matrix and error matrix; histograms of 
original payloads (a)-(d), histogram of Vrindavan India (a), histogram of Patti India (b), histogram of Okhla 
India (c), histogram of Bangalore junction (d), histogram of corresponding dsf matrix (e)-(h), histogram of 
corresponding error matrix (i)-(l). 
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
We analyze the sensitivity [19] of the proposed scheme with 
respect to the payload which is distributed over three matrices. 
We define sensitivity as the strength of linear relationship 
between the payload and the corresponding matrices. 
Correlation coefficient is an appropriate objective measure for 
the strength of linear relationship amongst the payload and the 
corresponding matrices. The correlation coefficient is defined as 
  
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2 2
MN MN
M N
MN MN
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  (17) 
Where G is the payload, G is the mean value of the grayscales 
of the payload, MAT is the corresponding DSF matrix or error 
matrix or sign matrix and MAT is the mean value of the matrix. 
 
 If sensitivity is more, then for payloads with slightly 
different characteristics, the proposed scheme should be able to 
generate completely different DSF, error and sign matrices. The 
sensitivity of the proposed scheme is more if there is a weak 
linear relationship between the payload and a particular matrix. 
If the value of the correlation coefficient is either between 0 and 
0.7 or between 0 and -0.7 the strength of the linear relationship 
between payload and the corresponding matrix is considered to 
be weak [20]. Table 3 illustrates correlation coefficients for 
different payloads and the corresponding matrices. Results show 
that for different payloads the proposed scheme achieves 
acceptable correlation coefficients; hence high sensitivity. 
Table 3.     Correlation coeeficients for different payloads and 
corresponding matrices 
 
Images DSF 
matrix[r] 
Error 
matrix[r] 
Sign 
matrix[r] 
Vrindavan 
India 
0.1175 -0.4232 -0.5350 
Patti India -0.2438 -0.6240 -0.5436 
Okhla India -0.1722 -0.5809 -0.6063 
Bangalore 
Junction 
-0.4492 -0.6066 -0.6150 
4.4 Computational Complexity 
If we consider a payload of size N N  of 256 grayscales total 
number of comparisons to compute the frequency of occurrence 
of each gray level in the payload is at most 2256 N .  The 
frequency of any gray level can have a maximum value of 2N , 
hence the division with the corresponding divisor which in this 
case is
2
1
N
level i

   , where 
 
is the mapping parameter, 
involve at most  subtractions which is a constant. For 
2N
frequency values computational cost of DSF matrix is
2N . 
There are 2N pixel values in the original payload and 2N DSF 
values in DSF matrix, computational complexity for error 
matrix computation is at most 2N  as there will be 2N
subtractions. For sign matrix evaluation the total number of 
comparisons is at most 2N . So, the total computational 
complexity for matrix decomposition is given by  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2(256 ) (256 2 ) ( )O N N N N O N N N O N       
 
 
(18) 
4.5  Time Analysis 
The major goal of the proposed payload distribution scheme is 
to reduce the computation time. We have implemented the 
scheme and computed the time elapsed in distribution of the 
payloads to different matrices. The proposed scheme has been 
implemented using MATLAB 2010 on a system with 2.10GHz-
Intel (R) Core™ i3-2310M CPU, 3GB DDR2 RAM and 64-bit 
windows 7 operating system. The time taken to distribute each 
payload of different size over three matrices has been shown in 
Table 4. Table 4 also illustrates the computation time taken by 
two state-of-art encryption algorithms, AES and DES, to 
encrypt same set of payloads. Results show that the proposed 
scheme achieves significant reduction in time for distribution 
and recovery of the payloads. Especially recovery process 
shows considerable reduction in computation time.  
Table 4.     Computation time for payload distribution and recovery using the proposed scheme and computation time for encryption and 
decryption of the payload using state-of-art encryption techniques 
Image Size 
Proposed Method DES AES 
Matrix 
Generation 
time(s) 
Recovery 
time(s) 
Encryption 
time(s) 
Decryption 
time(s) 
Encryption 
time(s) 
Decryption 
time(s) 
Vrindavan 
20 20 
0.0624 0.0035 18.2053 18.0582 33.0098 33.3480 
Pattiindia 0.1560 0.0103 15.9653 15.6285 32.7602 32.5925 
Okhla India 0.0624 0.0083 17.4409 17.7351 33.0098 32.9358 
Bangalore 
Junction 
0.0624 0.0083 18.0961 18.2639 32.1830 32.5281 
        
Vrindavan 
30 30 
0.0936 0.0058 40.8723 41.0526 62.4482 32.5724 
Pattiindia 0.1958 0.0063 38.1422 38.9533 63.7742 33.9337 
Okhla India 0.0624 0.0091 40.9815 40.9462 62.4170 32.3684 
Bangalore 
Junction 
0.0780 0.0085 41.3403 41.3857 62.3546 32.4879 
        
Vrindavan 
40 40 
0.0936 0.0048 69.2332 69.3827 134.5197 134.4894 
Pattiindia 0.1980 0.0085 69.5608 69.7250 136.3137 136.7465 
Okhla India 0.0780 0.0072 74.0849 73.9268 133.9581 133.4813 
 5 Conclusions 
Extent of visual distortion introduced in the matrices is enough to conceal the payload without adding significant computational 
complexity to the steganography system. Primary objective of the proposed scheme is to achieve higher level of confidentiality 
in absence of standard encryption techniques which add up to complexity of the stego system. Experimental results show that 
the proposed scheme effectively achieve the objective. Even though the proposed scheme has been implemented and analyzed 
for satellite images, can be used for any grayscale image.  
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